Who gains from more information on the quality of pharmaceutical drugs?
Introduction
A commonly held view in the policy debate and the medical community is that too few well performed post-approval clinical trials-so-called Phase IV trials-are carried out; i.e., clinical trials that really establish the relative e¤ectiveness within a class of drugs (e.g. Angell 2004 , and Bernstein and Bernstein 2006) . There is no regulation requiring drug companies to do Phase IV trials 1 , and drug companies are believed to have no incentives to voluntarily carry out informative trials. Consumers, on the other hand, are believed to have much to gain from more information on drug e¤ectiveness. Marcia Angell-former editor-in-chief at New England Journal of Medicine-argues in a widely spread book that the market left to its own will provide too few well designed post-approval clinical trials that directly compare one drug with another: "The last thing drug companies want is a head-to-head comparison with older drugs" (Angell, 2004, p. 98) . 2 She therefore strongly advocates legislation that obliges entrant …rms to carry out such clinical trials when launching a new drug.
In this paper we show, in a theoretical model with symmetric quality uncertainty, that in fact the opposite is true: it is not in the interest of consumers that informative clinical trials are carried out. Drug companies, on the other hand, increase their expected pro…ts by performing trials that reveal which drug is better, unless the cost for carrying out trials is too high. That is, there is no strategic reason for companies to keep quality uncertain.
A legislation that requires companies to carry out such clinical trials-as recommended by Angell-will never bene…t consumers. It may however bene…t …rms as it can solve a coordination problem where …rms want their rivals to carry the cost of a clinical trial. If trial costs are su¢ ciently high, on the other hand, legislation forces …rms to perform unpro…table trials, which can hamper pharmaceutical development.
The basic reason …rms increase their expected pro…ts by performing Phase IV trials is that it helps them di¤erentiate their products from their competitors'. What non-economists may not realize, is that in oligopolistic markets it is the di¤erences in quality between products that determine prices and pro…ts, rather than the level of quality; that is, it is worse for a …rm to produce a drug with the same quality as the competitor, than to produce a drug with a lower quality. From a consumer perspective clinical trials drive up prices by di¤erentiating products 1 However, it is increasingly common that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires companies to conduct con…rmatory studies just to make sure the new drug is safe. In fact, about two-thirds of all new molecular entities approved in 2000 were supposed to undergo Phase IV studies for follow up on safety (Angell, 2004, p. 163) . 2 To establish the relative e¤ectiveness of drugs a head-to-head clinical trial is generally needed.
without increasing expected quality in the market. Trials naturally reduce uncertainty, but the price e¤ect dominates.
That clinical trials are important as an instrument to improve pro…tability is supported empirically by Azoulay (2002) , who …nds that results from clinical trials have positive e¤ects on pro…ts. Our paper provides a theoretical explanation for these empirical …ndings; i.e., why clinical research after approval may be bene…cial to …rms.
Anecdotal evidence from the industry also indicates that pharmaceuticals might gain when quality uncertainty is unveiled. For example, extensive head-to-head clinical trials have been carried out between Nexium (esomeprazol)-AstraZeneca's ulcer and heartburn drug of proton pump inhibitor type-and other proton pump inhibitors. For some uses Nexium is shown to be better (Castell et al 2002; Kahrilas et al, 2001; Labenz et al, 2003; Richter et al 2001) , whereas for other uses it is not (Armstrong, 2004) . It has been a clear advantage to
AstraZeneca that Nexium is better in some instances, since it has allowed them to charge a much higher price. 3 However, it is questionable whether this has been of bene…t to consumers, since less uncertainty comes with a higher price.
The theoretical case for why …rms wish to di¤erentiate their products vertically is well established (see Gabszewicz and Thissé 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982) . We add to the analysis by noting that the elimination of quality uncertainty increases product di¤erentiation, as ex-post realizations by de…nition are more extreme than ex-ante expectations over potential outcomes. 4 Previous papers have addressed the issue of uncertain product quality in an asymmetric information context (e.g. Bagwell and Riordan 1991 , Riordan 1986 , Rogerson 1988 , Wolinsky 1983 , and Bester 1998 ). In our model, however, information is symmetric; that is, neither part knows the quality before the trial is performed. We do not believe that the main informational problem in the market for prescription drugs concerns asymmetric information. 5 Instead 3 If they had not shown that they were better than Losec (omeprazol), they would have had to cut their price approximately 50 percent on the Swedish market, as indicated by a report from the Swedish Pharmaceutical Bene…ts Board (2006) . 4 This follows from the same logic as the standard error of a mean estimate is always smaller than the standard deviation of the population. 5 Asymmetric information could exist to the extent that pharmaceutical …rms are better informed about the e¢ cacy and side e¤ects of their drug, than patients and doctors are. This is probably usually the case.
Doctors do not have the time to fully inform themselves about what has been shown in clinical research about each drug, and most patients do not have the knowledge to process the information even if they had the time.
Information asymmetry could also be due to selective reporting of results from clinical research, which there has been evidence of, e.g. Melander et al (2003) .
there is major aggregate uncertainty, where neither …rms, nor doctors nor patients know for certain which drug is more e¤ective. A major reason for this is that long term e¤ects cannot be detected until the drug has been in long term use.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the set-up of the model, and derives and compares pro…ts with and without informative clinical trials. Section three compares consumer surpluses with and without trial. The …nal section concludes and discusses the results.
Pro…ts
In order to address whether pharmaceutical …rms have an incentive to carry out voluntary clinical trials, expected ex-ante pro…ts when a trial is carried out will here be compared to pro…ts when a trial is not carried out. Before pro…ts are calculated, though, the structure of the model must be outlined. The setting is similar to Gabszewicz and Thissé (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) but introduces uncertainty in qualities in the context of pharmaceutical markets.
We …rst assume that the e¤ectiveness of a drug that has been registered by the drug approval authorities, e.g. FDA (or EMEA in the EU), is still uncertain as it enters the market, and that the ignorance is symmetric among producers and patients. The uncertainty is assumed to be possible to resolve through a Phase IV study only; that is, through a voluntary clinical trial taking place after registration.
Next, consider that an agent with a certain realized health condition faces the following quasi-linear utility
where he gains utils from general consumption, Y, and from consuming one unit of a pharmaceutical drug of quality h, for which he pays a price P . The …rst term in the utility function can be characterized as the health-related utility generated by the drug. Preference for drugs, , di¤ers across agents and is uniformly distributed across the population ~U ; . Patients with larger values of receive higher health-related utility from a drug of a certain quality h. The only di¤erence among patients is the heterogeneity in the preference parameter .
In the pharmaceutical market for this particular condition there are two …rms producing one drug each. An incumbent …rm i is producing a drug of known quality h i , as it has been in the market su¢ ciently long for its quality to have been resolved through earlier Phase IV trials. The incumbent is now facing new competition from an entrant …rm j producing a drug with unknown quality. The quality of drug j is assumed to be distributed dichotomously;
that is, quality is either realized as low, h j , or as high, h j . Information on h j , h j , and on the probability of quality being low, p, is known from inconclusive Phase III studies upon which registration is based. Based on this information patients form expectations of the health-related utility obtained from consuming drug j; i.e., E(h
The distribution of quality.
The entrant, …rm j, is assumed to enter the market only when it captures the upper end of the market; that is, when …rm j can charge a higher price for its drug than can …rm i, i.e. when P j > P i -which it can if drug j provides a higher health-related utility,
The decision problem, facing both …rms, is whether to resolve the quality uncertainty of drug j by performing a Phase IV trial. 8 If the trial is done and h j is realized, …rm j continues to sell to the upper end of the market and …rm j to the lower end of the market, but the di¤erence in product quality will be larger than the expected di¤erence before the trial. If, on the other hand, h j is realized then …rm j will now sell to the lower end of the market while …rm i will instead sell to the upper end of the market. We also assume that performing a clinical trial also carries a cost, , that …rms will have to take into account. Costs for clinical trials can be a substantial part of total development costs for a project (Dimasi, Hansen and Grabowski, 2003) .
The timing of events is as follows; …rm j has just entered and captured the upper end of the market, based on the expectations on drug j. Now, either of the two …rms can decide whether to resolve the uncertainty through a Phase IV trial.
Next, we will calculate and compare the pro…ts if no trial is performed with the expected ex-ante pro…ts if at least one of the …rms decides to resolve the uncertainty. 6 Letting quality of both drugs be unknown, or letting the distribution of quality be continuous, will not change the qualitative results in the analysis.
7 This assumption comes from the empirical observation that few, if any, new drugs-based on new chemical entities-are launched with the scope to capture the lower end of the market. Still, the model can be extended to include the case when Pj < Pi-i.e. when E(h j ) < h i -but this does not change the qualitative results, see Appendix. 8 In the present context we abstract from the distinction between head-to-head trials and trials aganist placebo.
Not resolving uncertainty: No clinical trial
When neither …rm performs a Phase IV trial the exact quality of drug j will remain uncertain; with probability p the quality is low and with 1 p it is high. Equilibrium pro…ts in the market will therefore depend on the expectations of drug j's quality.
The …rst step in …nding market equilibrium is to de…ne the demand functions for drug i and j. We …rst note that the expected utility of drug j for an agent with preferences is
where N T denotes no trial. For convenience the expected health-related utility gain from drug j, E(h j ), is replaced with its certainty equivalent, e h j ; that is, the certain quality level that provides an agent with the same utility as the expected quality, i.e. e h j = E(h j ) where e h j < E(h j ). Now, an agent choosing between drugs i and j will be indi¤erent to the two if they provide him with the same level of utility
which de…nes b , the preferences of the marginal individual who is indi¤erent to the two drugs.
Patients with preferences > b will consume drug j whereas those < b will consume drug i. From equation (3) it follows that …rm j serves the higher end of the market-charges a higher price P j P i > 0-only when the (expected) health-related utility generated by drug j is higher than the (certain) gain provided by drug i. In other words, the demand for drugs i and j respectively is de…ned as
In market equilibrium …rms i and j maximize
where k = i; j. By taking …rst order conditions the equilibrium prices are obtained as
If the value of drug i's and j's quality is the same-i.e. if they generate the same health related utility-there will be a …erce price competition driving both prices down to the marginal production cost c. Any mark-up over marginal production cost, c, will thus be generated by di¤erences in the value of perceived or realized qualities. As quality di¤erentiation grows larger both …rms experience an increasing market power and thus higher mark-ups. Note that …rm j-serving the upper end of the market-has a larger mark-up. If e h j is increased, ceteris paribus, the price of drug j will increase both because of (i) laxer competition and (ii) a larger relative quality advantage of drug j; as consumers are prepared to pay for a higher relative quality. For drug i the laxer competition dominates over the reduced relative quality e¤ect, and thus the price of drug i increases with a higher perceived quality of drug j; i.e.,
with higher e h j . In order for the market to have room for both a high and a low quality brand-i.e. for the price of drug i to be positive-there has to be su¢ cient heterogeneity among consumers > 2 .
By substituting equations (4) and (5) into the characterization of the marginal consumer,
equation (3), we …nd that
the relative location, i.e. the characteristics, of the marginal consumer only depends on the heterogeneity of consumers-a primitive of the model setup-and the equilibrium pro…ts for the two …rms therefore become
Pro…ts for both …rms are increasing with di¤erences in perceived and realized qualities, and for a given di¤erence in quality …rm j earns higher pro…ts than …rm i. These are standard results in oligopoly models with vertical production di¤erentiation, see for example Tirole (1988).
Resolving uncertainty: Clinical trial
The quality of drug j does not have to be uncertain, since both …rm i and j have the possibility to perform a Phase IV study. It would be bene…cial for a …rm if uncertainty were resolved only if this would increase the …rm's pro…ts in expectation. When the uncertainty is removed, …rm j's quality is either realized as high (h j ) or as low (h j ), and in order to …nd the expected pro…ts we …rst have to calculate market pro…ts in the di¤erent realizations and then take expectations over the realizations. We will initially disregard the cost, , of performing a trial.
Pro…ts after the trial
Taking …rst the case when the quality of drug j is realized as high, i.e. when h j = h j , and characterizing the marginal consumer, b , who is indi¤erent between drugs i and j
where T denotes that uncertainty is resolved through a trial, and H denotes that the quality of drug j is realized as high. In this case-when h j = h j -…rm j will serve the upper end of the market and will charge a higher price: the demand for drugs i and j can be characterized by the location of b ; that is, D
T;H j
.The two …rms face the following pro…t maximization problem
where k = i; j. When the quality of drug j is realized as high the equilibrium pro…ts become
In the other case when the quality of drug j is revealed as low, i.e. where h j = h j , equilibrium pro…ts are obtained by setting up similar pro…t maximization problems. By …rst deriving
where L denotes that drug j has a low quality-and taking …rst order conditions the equilibrium pro…ts are obtained as
It is interesting to note that when the quality of drug j is revealed as high a trial will always generate a larger diversity between the high and the low quality, and with more diversi…ed drugs there will be higher pro…ts in both ends of the market. In other words, both …rm i-in the upper end of the market-and …rm j-in the low end of the market-will earn higher pro…ts after the trial ( When a trial reveals the quality of drug j to be low, however, the pro…ts of …rm i and j can either increase or decrease depending on how di¤erentiated the market becomes when uncertainty is resolved (h i h j ).
Expected pro…ts before the trial
Taking expectations over pro…ts in the di¤erent realizations-equations (10)- (13)-the exante pro…ts when uncertainty is revealed becomes
Now, it is important to note that a Phase IV trial also has a cost, , which is carried by a …rm that is performing the trial. This implies that a …rm that is carrying out a trial has an expected pro…t of E T k , where k = i; j, while the rival will have an expected pro…t of E T k .
Comparing pro…ts with and without trial
The next issue is whether elimination of quality uncertainty will bene…t …rms and whether the market voluntarily will eliminate the uncertainty. Addressing this with a standard duopoly model with vertical product di¤erentiation …rst leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a duopoly with vertical quality di¤ erentiation both …rms will always earn higher expected pro…ts when quality di¤ erences are eliminated than when quality di¤ erences remain uncertain, given that the …rms do not have to carry the cost of the clinical trial.
Proof. The gain in pro…t for …rm j when uncertainty is eliminated is obtained by taking the di¤erence between equations (14) and (7)
which is positive. Hence, …rm j's expected pro…ts are increased when quality di¤erences are disclosed.
Similarly, …rm i's pro…t gain when uncertainty is resolved is obtained by taking the di¤erence between equations (15) and (8)
which is positive. Firm i will also increase its expected pro…ts when quality di¤erences are disclosed.
This implies that there is no strategic reason for …rms to prefer quality uncertainty over quality certainty, as both …rms ex ante would prefer a state where quality uncertainty were eliminated. To understand this result, …rst note that the basic mechanism generating economic pro…ts in a duopoly market with vertical product di¤erentiation is heterogeneity in quality. By resolving uncertainty the expected quality di¤erence between drugs i and j is increased, and with larger di¤erences in quality, pro…ts are higher both in the upper and the lower end of the market.
With quality uncertainty …rm j is serving the upper end of the market with a moderate quality advantage based on the expected quality of drug j. In the event that its quality is revealed as high, however, drug j gains a considerable quality advantage over drug i; since, h i < e h j < h j . Thereby …rm j receives a substantial increase in pro…ts. If, on the other hand, the quality of drug j is unveiled as low, …rm j takes over the lower end of the market. This implies that …rm j may face a reduction in pro…ts as it goes from serving the upper to the lower end of the market. Still, the reduction in pro…ts-by ending up in the lower end of the market-will be less than proportional than its probability of actually ending up there.
The clinical trial can thus be described as a lottery where the expected value of the gamble is higher than the price of the lottery ticket. This is illustrated in in …gure 2 where the pro…t functions (12) and (10) For …rm i the gain from elimination of uncertainty is easily seen. If …rm i continues to serve the low quality segment of the market after the uncertainty is eliminated, it will have a larger quality disadvantage, which will give greater market power and thus higher pro…ts. If the quality of drug j is revealed as low, on the other hand, …rm i will capture the upper end of the market and will potentially earn higher pro…ts. If the heterogeneity in quality is su¢ ciently small, however, …rm i may well reduce its pro…ts, but this reduction in pro…t is always less than proportional to the probability of capturing the upper end of the (11) and (13) trial ) and (…rm i is not performing a trial, …rm j is performing a trial ).
(ii) Follows directly from E T j N T j < 0, where k = i; j.
When the cost of performing a trial is small, E T k N T k > 0 with k = i; j, both …rms would increase their expected pro…ts by unilaterally performing a trial, but face a coordination problem since the rival …rm would increase its pro…ts even more by not performing a trial; that is, the rival would bene…t from elimination of uncertainty but would not have to carry the trial cost. Both …rms want uncertainty to be eliminated, but want their rival to defray the cost of the trial. Therefore there is no unique equilibrium where the market voluntarily provides elimination of uncertainty: in the two equilibriums either …rm i or …rm j performs a trial. 9 As …rms cannot coordinate their actions we may end up in an outcome where no trial is performed, or where both …rms are carrying out trials.
In the other case, when the cost of performing is high,
both …rms would reduce their expected pro…ts by unilaterally performing a trial. The high cost for eliminating uncertainty is a deterrent, and therefore no trial will be carried out.
With a cost of performing a Phase IV trial, there is no unique equilibrium where the market is eliminating the quality uncertainty, either the cost leads to a coordination problem where each …rm wants its rival to carry out the trial, or the cost is prohibitively high. In the case where trial costs are low, E T k N T k > 0, the regulation solves the coordination problem by coordinating the …rms to one of the Nash equilibria; that is, the equilibrium where the entrant …rm j performs the trial. Both …rms are better o¤ with the regulation since their expected pro…ts increase when quality information is revealed through the trial.
When trial costs are high however, E T k N T k < 0, the entrant, …rm j, would lose from the regulation as its expected pro…t would be reduced. The incumbent, …rm i, would on the other hand bene…t from information disclosure without having to bear its cost. Even if the incumbent gains from the disclosure total pro…ts in the market are reduced by the legislation.
If trial costs are really high, E T k < 0, a legislation can even hamper technological development. A trial would make the project of developing the drug unpro…table, and if …rm j chooses not to enter the market consumers will not have the chance of bene…ting from the higher expected quality of drug j-a quality h j with probability p. This would also reduce competition in the pharmaceutical market for this particular condition as …rm i would keep its monopoly.
Consumer welfare
Both …rm i and …rm j have incentives to perform a Phase IV study, but to understand if a trial is bene…cial to consumers we ask: what would consumers decide if they had a say in whether the trial should be carried out? To address the welfare consequences of Phase IV trials we will …rst calculate the consumer surplus when no trial is performed, and then compare this with the expected ex-ante consumer surplus when uncertainty is cleared away.
Consumer surplus when no trial is performed
If no trial is performed …rm j supplies the upper end of the market as e h j > h i . To …nd the expected consumer surplus generated by drug j …rst note that the maximum price a consumer with preferences is prepared to pay for drug j is the total where all consumer surplus is exactly exhausted. That is, the reservation price P R j is the price where the utility from consuming drug j is just equal to the utility from not consuming any medicament, and is obtained as u j (At the reservation price) = u(When not consuming any drug)
The expected surplus for a consumer can be de…ned as the utility obtained from drug j at the actual price P j relative to the utility obtained at the reservation price, P R j , that is
This is an expected consumer surplus since consumers do not know the actual quality of drug j, only its expected quality. By summing the surplus over all individuals in the high quality segment; that is, consumers 2 ( b ; ), the aggregate surplus generated by drug j is obtained
In the same way the consumer surplus generated by drug i becomes E CS
Consumer surplus when trial is performed
When the uncertainty of drug j's quality is cleared away it is either high or low. To …nd the expected ex-ante consumer surplus we …rst have to calculate the consumer surpluses in the di¤erent realizations and then take the expectations over the realizations.
If drug j is realized as being of high quality, i.e. h j = h j , its reservation price-at which agents'are indi¤erent between consuming drug j and not consuming any drug-becomes
The surplus from good j for an agent -de…ned as the di¤erence in utility obtained at the actual price and at the reservation price-can therefore be de…ned in the following way
The aggregate consumer surplus of drug j is obtained by summing over all consumers 2 b ; choosing drug j; that is,
In a corresponding way, the aggregated consumer surplus for drug i, and for the case when the quality of drug j is realized as low (h j = h j ) can be obtained as
The expected consumer surplus generated by drug k is equal to
where k = i; j.
Comparing consumer surpluses
To determine whether consumers gain from more information on quality we now compare aggregated expected consumer surplus from lifting the quality uncertainty, with the aggregate consumer surplus from the expected quality when no clinical trial is performed. The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consumers are worse-o¤ if uncertainty about quality is eliminated.
Proof. The e¤ect on aggregate consumer surplus from performing a trial-with …rm j serving the upper end of the market in the no-trial case-is obtained as
which is negative under the assumption that 2 > 0; i.e., the assumption that consumer preferences are su¢ ciently heterogenous for the market to cover both …rms.
Agents will not gain from a trial ex-ante; that is, all consumers prefer that quality remains uncertain rather than being resolved through a Phase IV clinical trial. What proposition 3 says is that with risk averse agents the consumer surplus over expected quality is higher than the expected consumer surplus over realized quality. The expected quality will not increase with a trial, but the expected dispersion in quality will increase, and as a result the expected prices will increase after a trial. Before the trial consumers do not know the realizations that will follow-whether h j is high or low-they only know that they for certain will face higher expected prices. Ex-post they may very well gain from a trial if drug j is revealed as a high quality drug-as the average drug quality in the market increases-but this is not certain.
Corollary 5 A legislation obliging pharmaceuticals to carry out Phase IV clinical trials-in order to establish relative e¤ ectiveness-when launching a new drug is harmful to consumers.
Consumers would ex-ante prefer a state without legislation that forces an entrant, …rm j, to disclose quality information; to a state with legislation, as they are better-o¤ under information uncertainty. In the case when the cost of the trial is so high that …rm j would choose not to enter the market if forced to perform a trial, E T k < 0, the legislation would still be harmful to consumers. Since …rm j does not enter the market-as a consequence of the regulation-…rm i can charge monopoly prices.
Discussion
The market for prescription drugs is one of the most heavily regulated markets. Having a drug approved by the FDA and EMEA involves sending a truckload of documentation on the e¢ cacy, safety and tolerability of the drug. Every step taken when developing the drug is scrutinized. There is a constant discussion on whether to introduce additional regulation; one such discussion is a legislation demanding entrant …rms to carry out head-to-head clinical trials with competing drugs, in order to establish which drug is more e¤ective. This paper analyses whether this is a good idea: we …nd that it is not. The purpose of such legislation would be to protect consumers, providing them with all the necessary information to make a fully-informed choice on which drug to use. However, eliminating uncertainty comes with a price that consumers do not want to pay.
The second reason why the legislation is a bad idea is that it will be costly: developing a new drug carries high costs, where the bulk of these costs consist of taking drugs through clinical trials (DiMasi, 2003) . A large part of trial costs comes from paying doctors per patient they enrol, so trial costs rise fast with the number of patients taking part in the trial. Demanding …rms to carry out head-to-head trials will increase these costs substantially as trials will have to be much larger to achieve statistically signi…cant di¤erences. For a block-buster drug this may be worth doing, but for drugs treating rare diseases it may prove prohibitive.
The model rests on the critical assumption that …rms compete on price and the more di¤erentiated products are, the larger mark-ups will be. There are a number of empirical papers studying whether di¤erences in quality (e¤ectiveness, side e¤ects, safety, tolerability) are re ‡ected in drug prices. A consistent …nding is that drugs which represent important therapeutic gains, are priced signi…cantly higher than existing drugs used for the same purpose (e.g. Ekelund and Persson, 2003; Lu and Comanor, 1995) . They also …nd that drugs which largely duplicate actions of currently available drugs are typically priced at comparable levels, which is in accordance with our model. These papers provide some empirical support for the assumptions of the model; i.e. that quality di¤erences are one of the major determinants of drug prices.
The relation between quality and prices has not been analyzed empirically in the pharmaceutical market. There are some papers studying price change over time, e.g. Lu and Comanor (1995) , and what is important in the present context is that there seems to be considerable price movements over time.
A. Firm j entering in the low end of the market, E(h j ) < h i
A.1 Pro…ts in the no trial case
Consider now the case when …rm j supples the lower end of the market (indicated by the superscript jLE). This is when E(h j ) < h i . Firm j maximizes, In equilibrium …rm has the following pro…ts, N T;jLE j
